Anki Deck Changes

Commit: dfd34acf - very advanced

Author: tprazak <t.prazak@gmail.com>

Date: 2026-02-22T23:41:05+01:00

Changes: 33 note(s) changed (32 added, 1 modified, 0 deleted)

Note 1: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: Air}:N+42>
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World
Keiretsu is a Japanese system of syndicate ownership which centers around a main bank.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World
Keiretsu is a Japanese system of syndicate ownership which centers around a main bank.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text {{c1::Keiretsu}} is a Japanese system of&nbsp;{{c2::syndicate ownership}} which centers around a main {{c3::bank}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World

Note 2: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: B#RRtF;Q-$
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
A way to deal with outside factors influencing the valuation of a company for the purposes of compensation are performance shares, which specify targets for measures of performance.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
A way to deal with outside factors influencing the valuation of a company for the purposes of compensation are performance shares, which specify targets for measures of performance.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text A way to deal with outside factors influencing the valuation of a company for the purposes of compensation are&nbsp;{{c1::performance shares}}, which&nbsp;{{c2::specify targets for measures of performance}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation

Note 3: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: C4|VB|n_)J
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
German boards of directors differ from the anglo-american ones in that there are two boards instead of only 1. 

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
German boards of directors differ from the anglo-american ones in that there are two boards instead of only 1. 
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text German boards of directors differ from the anglo-american ones in that&nbsp;{{c1::there are two boards instead of only 1}}.&nbsp;
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 4: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: Dx@.H^]dX?
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
Codetermination is prevalent in Germany because it is mandated by law.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
Codetermination is prevalent in Germany because it is mandated by law.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text Codetermination is prevalent in&nbsp;{{c1::Germany}} because&nbsp;{{c2::it is mandated by law}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 5: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: EWPpO.ugw8
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
A bad CEO may benefit from lucky events (e.g. operating in a high-growth industry) instead of their own skills.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
A bad CEO may benefit from lucky events (e.g. operating in a high-growth industry) instead of their own skills.
This can bring the manager undeserved outsized compensation.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text A bad CEO may benefit from&nbsp;{{c1::lucky events (e.g. operating in a high-growth industry)}} instead of their own skills.
Extra This can bring the manager undeserved outsized compensation.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation

Note 6: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: G8t{L)ewF,
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
If there are two boards of directors then one of them is  the supervisory board and the other is the management board.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
If there are two boards of directors then one of them is  the supervisory board and the other is the management board.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text If there are two boards of directors then one of them is&nbsp;{{c1:: the supervisory board}} and the other is&nbsp;{{c2::the management board}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 7: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: HJtuR#diJ!
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
Overboarding is a problem which occurs when a board member is very desirable and thus is asked to sit on many boards at the same time, reducing their impact in any one of the boards.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
Overboarding is a problem which occurs when a board member is very desirable and thus is asked to sit on many boards at the same time, reducing their impact in any one of the boards.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text Overboarding is a problem which occurs when&nbsp;{{c1::a board member is very desirable and thus is asked to sit on many boards at the same time, reducing their impact in any one of the boards}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 8: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: Hdv=,cqo?R
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
An good way to encourage long-term thinking is by restricting the management's right to sell their shares even after they leave the company.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
An good way to encourage long-term thinking is by restricting the management's right to sell their shares even after they leave the company.
This is usually a restriction of a couple years
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text An good way to encourage long-term thinking is by&nbsp;{{c1::restricting the management's right to sell their shares even after they leave the company}}.
Extra This is usually a restriction of a couple years
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation

Note 9: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: LXk{E6*lAO
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
If the management decides to go against an advisory vote they risk shareholder backlash, e.g. in the form of exit and subsequent stock price drop.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
If the management decides to go against an advisory vote they risk shareholder backlash, e.g. in the form of exit and subsequent stock price drop.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text If the management decides to go against an advisory vote they risk {{c1::shareholder backlash, e.g. in the form of exit and subsequent stock price drop}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders

Note 10: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: M^w0jCvPwk
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
If an auditor finds no problems in a firm's financial statement, he issues an opinion that the statement is representative and in-line with GAAP.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
If an auditor finds no problems in a firm's financial statement, he issues an opinion that the statement is representative and in-line with GAAP.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text If an auditor finds no problems in a firm's financial statement, he issues an&nbsp;{{c1::opinion that the statement is representative and in-line with GAAP}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders

Note 11: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: N2LBN>_BBV
modified

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
Shareholders have 3 main ways of influencing a company's operations: 
  1. voting
  2. communicating with management
  3. selling their shares and walking away

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
Shareholders have 3 main ways of influencing a company's operations: 
  1. voting
  2. communicating with management
  3. selling their shares and walking away
all of these are mainly for shareholders holding large positions

After

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
Shareholders have 3 main ways of influencing a company's operations: 
  1. voting
  2. engaging with management
  3. selling their shares and walking away

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
Shareholders have 3 main ways of influencing a company's operations: 
  1. voting
  2. engaging with management
  3. selling their shares and walking away
all of these are mainly for shareholders holding large positions
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text Shareholders have 3 main ways of influencing a company's operations:&nbsp;<br><ol><li>{{c1:: voting}}<br></li><li>{{c2:: communicating with management}}<br></li><li>{{c3:: selling their shares and walking away}}<br></li></ol> Shareholders have 3 main ways of influencing a company's operations:&nbsp;<br><ol><li>{{c1:: voting}}<br></li><li>{{c2:: engaging with management}}<br></li><li>{{c3:: selling their shares and walking away}}<br></li></ol>
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders

Note 12: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: NQ8aP$9j%l
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
If an auditor uncovers severe problems they can issue an adverse opinion, which means that the financial statement contains material misstatements.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
If an auditor uncovers severe problems they can issue an adverse opinion, which means that the financial statement contains material misstatements.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text If an auditor uncovers severe problems they can issue an {{c1::adverse opinion}}, which means that the financial statement contains&nbsp;{{c2::material misstatements}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders

Note 13: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: O#f@%OK3)d
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
A large portion of a CEO's pay package is in equity, options or other instruments tied to the firm's performance

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
A large portion of a CEO's pay package is in equity, options or other instruments tied to the firm's performance
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text A large portion of a CEO's pay package is in&nbsp;{{c1::equity, options or other instruments tied to the firm's performance}}
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation

Note 14: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: c6RIbYV./+
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
A board with  more independent directors is seen as better for the shareholders.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
A board with  more independent directors is seen as better for the shareholders.
as an independent director is more willing to replace the management after it underperforms
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text A board with&nbsp;{{c1:: more}} independent directors is seen as better for the shareholders.
Extra as an independent director is more willing to replace the management after it underperforms
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 15: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: d/-@=m{*f6
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
A large board may have a free-rider problem, which menas that  directors are relying on others to monitor management, which results in no one holding the management accountable.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
A large board may have a free-rider problem, which menas that  directors are relying on others to monitor management, which results in no one holding the management accountable.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text A large board may have a&nbsp;{{c1::free-rider}} problem, which menas that&nbsp;{{c2:: directors are relying on others to monitor management, which results in no one holding the management accountable}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 16: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: d}Rp5:}1#g
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
An advisory vote is nonbinding and as such only expresses the opinion of the shareholders.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
An advisory vote is nonbinding and as such only expresses the opinion of the shareholders.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text An&nbsp;{{c1::advisory}} vote is&nbsp;{{c2::nonbinding and as such only expresses the opinion of the shareholders}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders

Note 17: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: ej8[_#Y@f~
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
The benefit of codetermination (for the employees) has shown to be a greater job stability with a disadvantage being  lower wages (by about 3 percent)

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
The benefit of codetermination (for the employees) has shown to be a greater job stability with a disadvantage being  lower wages (by about 3 percent)
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text The benefit of codetermination (for the employees) has shown to be&nbsp;{{c1::a greater job stability}} with a disadvantage being&nbsp;{{c1:: lower wages (by about 3 percent)}}
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 18: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: gE
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World
The keiretsu system seems to encourage long term thinking.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World
The keiretsu system seems to encourage long term thinking.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text The keiretsu system seems to encourage&nbsp;{{c1::long term thinking}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World

Note 19: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: gs5Dh;D&9Z
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
Performance shares can lead to agency problems where the management manipulates the numbers to reach performance targets while hurting future value.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
Performance shares can lead to agency problems where the management manipulates the numbers to reach performance targets while hurting future value.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text Performance shares can lead to&nbsp;{{c1::agency problems where the management manipulates the numbers to reach performance targets while hurting future value}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation

Note 20: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: lQp4qk/0nT
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
A problem with having too small of a board is  the board being unable to monitor all of the firm's activities.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
A problem with having too small of a board is  the board being unable to monitor all of the firm's activities.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text A problem with having too small of a board is&nbsp;{{c1:: the board being unable to monitor all of the firm's activities}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 21: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: mD=!Q!ne;>
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
An activist investor is an investor which acquires a large block of equity in a company and tries to influence the operations of the company.

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
An activist investor is an investor which acquires a large block of equity in a company and tries to influence the operations of the company.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text An&nbsp;{{c1::activist}} investor is an investor which&nbsp;{{c2::acquires a large block of equity in a company and tries to influence the operations of the company}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders

Note 22: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: n%Me&mq[;i
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
The strongest action the board can take is firing the CEO.

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
The strongest action the board can take is firing the CEO.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text The strongest action the board can take is&nbsp;{{c1::firing the CEO}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 23: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: o]Kbfs8>O[
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
Poorly setup compensation may encourage agency problems such as short-termism

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
Poorly setup compensation may encourage agency problems such as short-termism
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text Poorly setup compensation may encourage agency problems such as&nbsp;{{c1::short-termism}}
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation

Note 24: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: onyZ$3]9L7
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
Boards in the U.S. and UK are typically  smaller and more independent.

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
Boards in the U.S. and UK are typically  smaller and more independent.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text Boards in&nbsp;{{c1::the U.S. and UK}} are typically&nbsp;{{c2:: smaller and more independent}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 25: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: q3+t4zhw(X
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
The process of codetermination is one which not only considers the shareholders when electing a board but also the employees.

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
The process of codetermination is one which not only considers the shareholders when electing a board but also the employees.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text The process of&nbsp;{{c1::codetermination}} is one which not only considers the shareholders when electing a board but also the&nbsp;{{c2::employees}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 26: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: r[NZ49uliH
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
The proposal of management compensation is the responsibility of the compensation committee

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation
The proposal of management compensation is the responsibility of the compensation committee
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text The proposal of management compensation is the responsibility of the&nbsp;{{c1::compensation committee}}
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::5._Management_Compensation

Note 27: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: tNFcD&ymr%
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World
In a keiretsu system companies mainly work with other companies within their group.

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World
In a keiretsu system companies mainly work with other companies within their group.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text In a keiretsu system companies&nbsp;{{c1::mainly work with other companies within their group}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World

Note 28: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: tgY(N5.f>Y
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World
The keiretsu system has positives in that it gives companies more space when they get in financial problems.

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World
The keiretsu system has positives in that it gives companies more space when they get in financial problems.
This is because the company's lender is most likely the main group bank.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text The keiretsu system has positives in that it&nbsp;{{c1::gives companies more space when they get in financial problems}}.
Extra This is because the company's lender is most likely the main group bank.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::6._Governance_Regimes_around_the_World

Note 29: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: tq!OpFBpV:
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
A binding vote is a vote which the management has to follow.

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
A binding vote is a vote which the management has to follow.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text A&nbsp;{{c1::binding}} vote is a vote which&nbsp;{{c2::the management has to follow}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders

Note 30: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: w-X_u!jfl=
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
If an auditor finds problems they can issue a qualified opinion which states that the accounts of the firm have not been represented accurately.

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
If an auditor finds problems they can issue a qualified opinion which states that the accounts of the firm have not been represented accurately.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text If an auditor finds problems they can issue a&nbsp;{{c1::qualified opinion}} which states that&nbsp;{{c2::the accounts of the firm have not been represented accurately}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders

Note 31: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Classic
GUID: x~-;glNz[]
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
Why would a company issue two classes of equity?

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
Why would a company issue two classes of equity?
to make some shares have more voting rights than others
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Front Why would a company issue two classes of equity?
Back to make some shares have more voting rights than others
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors

Note 32: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: z^@;3kOGg[
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
Shares with voting rights are typically worth more than shares without.

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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders
Shares with voting rights are typically worth more than shares without.
this is because voting rights give you control of the company and potentially private benefits, the premium for this right is different across regions being very high in South Korea for example
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Text Shares with voting rights are typically&nbsp;{{c1::worth more}} than shares without.
Extra this is because voting rights give you control of the company and potentially private benefits, the premium for this right is different across regions being very high in South Korea for example
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::3._Monitoring_by_Shareholders

Note 33: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance

Deck: ETH::Science in Perspective::Advanced Finance
Note Type: Horvath Cloze
GUID: z~yOb6(AE;
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ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
In France, firms can choose between having one or two boards.

Back

ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
In France, firms can choose between having one or two boards.
Field-by-field Comparison
Field Before After
Text In France, firms&nbsp;{{c1::can choose between having one or two boards}}.
Tags: ETH::Science_in_Perspective::Advanced_Finance::19::2._Monitoring_by_the_Board_of_Directors
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